Which side of history are we on?

Last week's kerfuffle in Kyrgyzstan reminded me of Amartya Sen's comment in Development as Freedom about the notion that some cultures aren't suited to democracy: such assertions are more likely to be made by the powerful than by the ordinary people subjected to their rule. A few weeks ago, Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiyev said that "the model of democracy that was accepted in the last century and that was based mainly on elections and human rights" wasn't really suited to modern-day Kyrgyzstan. (This was a ballsy statement coming from the guy who was swept into power by the 2005 "Tulip Revolution," which protested the rigging of elections by the previous government.) The opposition protesters who toppled Bakiyev's government on April 7 begged to differ. “You can call this a revolution. You can call this a people’s revolt,” said the interim leader of the new government, Roza Otunbayeva. “Either way, it is our way of saying that we want justice and democracy.”

There is no excuse for the violence carried out by many of those protesters, any more than for the violence employed against them by the police. But this uprising reflects undeniable frustration with the growing corruption and repression of the Bakiyev government. And it calls into question the Obama administration's reluctance to defend democratic values -- with strong policies, not just rhetoric.

There are numerous rationales offered for not supporting democracy abroad. Some scholars, such as John Gray, agree with Bakiyev that liberal democracy is simply undesirable for non-Western societies. Others think, however desirable the spread of democracy might be, that pragmatism demands sacrificing democracy promotion in favor of other goals. For instance, Charles Kupchan, a professor at Georgetown, wrote recently in Foreign Affairs that "Obama is fully justified in putting the democratization agenda on the back burner and basing U.S. diplomacy toward other states on their external behavior, not their regime type. Even repressive regimes can be reliably cooperative when it comes to their conduct of foreign policy."

Events like those in Kyrgyzstan belie these notions. First, because they underscore that the desire for political participation extends well beyond the Western world. Second, because uncritical U.S. support for repressive regimes has a way of coming back to haunt us. Dictators fall, but resentment lasts. You would think we would have learned this lesson after our unfortunate experience with the Shah of Iran.


In Kyrgyzstan, both the Bush and Obama administrations gave Bakiyev a free pass on human rights and democracy for fear of jeopardizing our access to Kyrgyzstan's Manas airbase (which we use to deliver troops and supplies to Afghanistan). It looks like we'll hang on to the base by the skin of our teeth despite Kyrgyzstan's change of government, but as the New York Times reports, U.S. policy toward Bakiyev has put us on the wrong foot with the new leadership: "The American attitude toward Mr. Bakiyev ruffled opposition politicians in Kyrgyzstan, who said it was shameful for the United States to stand for democratic values in the developing world while maintaining an alliance with him." Our willingness to put principle aside in the past may have actually made it more difficult to win Kyrgyzstan's cooperation in the future.

Egypt may offer Obama a chance for redemption. There are clear signs that Egyptians want to see democratic reform in their country. The day before the revolt in Bishkek, a couple hundred citizens in Cairo demonstrated for greater political freedom and civil liberties (and were harshly suppressed by the police). Mohammed ElBaradei (the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency), who has been advocating for genuine democracy in Egypt and who may run in next year's presidential election, is broadly popular. (When I visited Egypt recently, no one had anything good to say about Mubarak, and a couple people openly expressed support for ElBaradei. One man, after denouncing Bush and praising Obama said: "Bush and Mubarak are the same. And Obama and Baradei are the same.")

But while Obama and State Department officials say the right things about democracy in Egypt, they have slashed funding for democracy assistance programs that support local, independent NGOs in Egypt. What funds America does provide are now channeled exclusively to NGOs approved by the Egyptian government.

Of course, given Egypt's strategic importance in the Middle East, the administration has to maintain a cooperative relationship with its government. But at the same time, the U.S. must push its ally to allow its people a say in how they are ruled, and support local activists who are trying to hold their government accountable. Otherwise we will be seen by Egyptians as complicit in their repression.


UPDATE: The New York Times has a great article today analyzing how Obama's realpolitik foreign policy de-emphasizes human rights and democracy.